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Abstract
The internal conflict in Colombia has 
propelled the development of security sector 
reform (ssr) programs; however, these pro-
grams have been usually linked to the influ-
ence of relations between the United States 
and Colombia in military and foreign policy 
terms. The main objective of this essay is to 
understand said interplay from the mid-1990’s 
to the early 2000’s, which marked the biggest 
transformations to the Colombian defense 
sector in human rights, doctrine, equipment, 
and human capital. The analysis shows that 
such influence allowed for the consolidation 
of an offensive strategy which helped the 
Colombian government turn the balance of 
the internal conflict in its favor.
Key words: Military Forces, bilateral rela-
tions, State security, armed conflict, guerrilla.
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UnA inflUenciA profUndA: 
relAciones bilAterAles estAdos 
Unidos-colombiA y reformA Al 
sector segUridAd (ssr), 1994-2002
resumen
El conflicto interno en Colombia ha 
impulsado el desarrollo de programas de re-
forma al sector seguridad (ssr); sin embargo, 
estos han estado normalmente vinculados a 
la influencia de la relación Estados Unidos-
Colombia en términos militares y de política 
exterior. El principal objetivo de este ensayo 
es entender dicha interacción desde mediados 
de los años noventa hasta principios del 2000, 
periodo que marcó las más grandes transfor-
maciones del sector defensa colombiano en 
derechos humanos, conceptos doctrinarios, 
equipamiento y capital humano. El análisis 
muestra que tal influencia permitió la con-
solidación de una estrategia ofensiva, la cual 
ayudó al Gobierno colombiano a inclinar el 
equilibrio del conflicto interno en su favor.
Palabras clave: Fuerzas Militares, relacio-
nes bilaterales, seguridad del Estado, conflicto 
armado, guerrilla.
introdUction
The internal conflict in Colombia has 
brought foreign influence to a very complex 
scenario of armed groups, war economies, and 
political motivations. In order to face all the 
challenges that emerged from this combina-
tion of variables, successive Colombian gov-
ernments have asked for foreign aid aimed at 
enhancing its military apparatus, and the role 
of the United States (us) has been especially 
influential in this trend. Once the Cold War 
and its ideological strife concluded, issues such 
as the War on Drugs and the War on Terror be-
came the bilateral agenda between both coun-
tries, replacing the discourse of communism as 
the main threat to American interests in Latin 
America. Such changes to the us foreign policy 
perspective ended up influencing its military 
aid packages directed towards client states on 
the basis of new political conditions related 
to liberal-democratic values which, in the 
case of Colombia, served to construct a deep 
Security Sector Reform (ssr) in all aspects 
(political, military, doctrine, and economic). 
Given this new scenario, it is necessary to 
ask, how was the Colombian defense policy 
re-accommodated in the 1990’s in the face of 
a new set of us defense interests and moral 
concerns? This essay is mainly devoted toward 
explaining such an important phenomenon 
for the contemporary military institutions 
of the Andean country by analyzing firstly, 
the us-Colombian military relationship in 
terms of the War on Drugs (1992-1998), as 
the first step of an ssr model and, secondly, 
in regard to the War on Terror (1998-2002). 
All of this will be studied before addressing 
some conclusions about these two periods 
in order to develop a prospective analysis in 
terms of a post-conflict environment.
The first part is chiefly aimed at studying 
the increasing violence of the internal conflict 
in relation with the strengthening of guerrillas, 
mainly the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (farc in Spanish), who used drug 
trafficking as its key financial engine. All this 
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was evolving amid the implementation of a 
stricter human rights doctrine, via a sort of 
US statecraft policy towards Colombia.
The second part develops a compre-
hensive analysis on how shifting priorities 
in Washington from the War on Drugs to 
the War on Terror was capitalized on by the 
Colombian government, with the purpose 
of improving its counterinsurgent strategy. 
This stage marked a rocketing tendency in 
the levels of violence related to the political 
conflict, which was exacerbated by the failed 
negotiations between the Colombian govern-
ment and the farc guerrillas in 2002. At the 
end, after analyzing these stages, it will be 
possible to draft some conclusions about the 
influence of us-Colombia bilateral relations in 
terms of military cooperation and ssr during 
the 1990’s and the early 2000’s. Finally, the 
question of how military forces will adapt to 
a new scenario during a post-conflict stage in 
which they seek internationalization through 
bilateral and multilateral platforms, and tri-
angulated-military cooperation.
Currently, literature on ssr is mainly con-
cerned with transitional scenarios from either 
autocracy to democracy or conflict to peace. 
In this sense, ssr is defined by the United 
Nations (un) as a process of evaluation, as-
sessment, implementation and monitoring 
of measures directed at developing “effective 
and accountable security for the state and its 
peoples without discrimination and with full 
respect for human rights and the rule of law”, 
being led by national authorities (United Na-
tions, 2012, p. 2). The un definition shows 
a general perspective that does not include a 
stage of transition as a sine qua non condition 
for implementing ssr, which had been the case 
of ssr in Colombia in the 1990’s.
Other multilateral platforms such as 
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (oecd), has related ssr to 
political objectives: mainly those of liberal 
democracies. In this sense, the ssr objective, 
according to the oecd, is to “…ensure that 
security and justice are provided in a manner 
consistent with democratic norms, human 
rights principles and the rule of law” (Or-
ganisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, 2007, p. 28).
Since the security policy in Colombia 
has been highly influenced by us military 
aid, and even more so from the late 1990’s 
to this day due to Plan Colombia, the ssr 
shapes answers to US perceptions of this 
field of study. For the Department of Defense 
(dod), the Department of State (dos) and the 
us Agency for International Development 
(usaid), “ssr refers to reform efforts directed 
at the institutions, processes, and forces that 
provide security and promote the rule of law” 
(usaid, dod, dos, 2009, p. 1). This concept 
has evolved through time by articulating top-
ics linked with the establishment of relevant 
legal and policy networks; improvement of 
civilian leadership; enhancement of coopera-
tion among security-related and civil institu-
tions; and management of the legacies of past 
or present conflicts or insecurity (p. 1). All 
of this is supported by reforms that seek a 
series of changes in security and intelligence 
institutions; justice; enhancement of civilian 
oversight; management of military and intel-
ligence services; community security; and the 
development of disarmament, demobilization 
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and reintegration programs (ddr) (p. 2). This 
is a more accurate definition in terms of the 
ssr process in Colombia as seen through at 
a glance in its bilateral military cooperation 
with the us.
This essay applies a descriptive method of 
study which aims at presenting the develop-
ments of ssr in Colombia, in relation with 
US military aid. In this sense, the most rel-
evant factors of such phenomenon are better 
observed by characterizing political, military 
and historic variables framed in both local 
and international dimensions. Interpretation 
of this information is going to be assessed 
through the international relations point of 
view in terms of constructivist and rational 
theories, in order to better understand defense 
cooperation with regard to seemingly com-
mon interests.
Finally, this research makes extensive 
use of primary sources from both us and 
Colombian institutions, such as declassified 
archives, presidential speeches, official reports 
from oversight apparatus, and newspaper 
articles. Equally important are secondary 
sources on ssr, such as academic research pa-
pers, journals, and studies from multilateral 
organizations, governments, and specialized 
think tanks and research centers. Certainly, 
the prospects of post-conflict in Colombia 
open new avenues of research and analyses in 
this issue, which need to be addressed by civil 
society in order to feed modern ssr proposals 
aimed at enhancing security and civil-military 
relationships in Colombia.
drUg trAfficking And the 
colombiAn defense’s hUmAn rights 
crisis (1994-1998): eArly stAges  
of ssr in the 1990’s
The 1990’s brought huge influence of 
drug cartels and the growing presence of 
guerrillas such as the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia (farc) and the National 
Liberation Army (eln), which, in contrast 
with other subversive groups1, persisted in 
the armed struggle against the establishment, 
even though a new constitution guaranteed 
improved levels of inclusiveness in the demo-
cratic game. By the mid-1990’s the issue of 
drug trafficking strengthened its branches, 
reaching the governing elite and becoming 
the main financial engine of both right and 
left wing subversive groups; this scenario was 
exacerbated by a rocketing tendency in the 
offensive actions of the farc guerrillas. In 
this context, the us emphasized its defense 
strategy in the War on Drugs, a core issue in 
1 During 1990 under the presidency of Virgilio Barco (1986-1990), four insurgent groups were the object of 
amnesties after their demobilization. The 19th of April Movement (M-19), the Peoples Liberation Army (epl), 
the indigenous guerrilla of Armed Movement Quintin Lame (maql), and the Workers Revolutionary Party of 
Colombia (prt), were part of an agreement with the Colombian Government before the Constituent Assembly 
of 1991. They were followed by the Socialist Renovation Movement (crs), a dissident fraction of the eln, and by 
the Urban Militias of Medellin during the Cesar Gaviria administration, being favored equally by amnesty laws 
(Chernick, 2012).
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the post-Cold War era along with the pro-
motion of human rights which became the 
pillars of the new shape of the Colombia-us 
military relationship.
By July 1992, the minister of defense, 
Rafael Pardo, along with representatives of 
the National Police and the military forces 
met with members of the US embassy where 
the chief objective was to design a bilateral 
strategy to place pressure on all fronts concern-
ing drug lords by working directly with the 
Chief Commander of Military Forces, General 
Manuel Alberto Murillo González, on the 
development of a plan, “…that fully involved 
the army, navy and air force” (American Em-
bassy Bogota, 1992, p. 3). The latter would be 
in charge of interdiction tasks in Colombian 
air space, while at the same time supporting 
army and police operations (American Em-
bassy Bogota, 1992). Generally speaking, 
this might be read as an early stage of joint 
and coordinated operations, emanating from 
bilateral talks in response to a non-traditional 
security threat for both nations.
The issue of drug trafficking marked bi-
lateral relations between Colombia and the us, 
a situation that was articulated by the Colom-
bian defense policy during a time when the 
Samper administration (1994-1998) lacked 
credibility due to the involvement of person-
nel from his previous presidential campaign 
with Cali drug lords, and the successive attacks 
on the Colombian military forces carried out 
by the farc guerrillas, such as the seizure of 
Las Delicias (1996) and Patascoy (1997). The 
Clinton administration, given the seriousness 
of the Colombian situation, expressed its 
support to President Ernesto Samper, while 
making clear the founding principle from 
which bilateral relations and military aid was 
to be seen: “…the primacy of the drug issue” 
(Department of State, 1994, p. 2). This meant 
reinforcing “…military measures against the 
traffickers…an active policy of aerial interdic-
tion and interception…legislation on money 
laundering…”, and tougher judicial measures 
along with judicial cooperation with the us 
(Department of State, 1994a, p. 3).
However, military aid and the develop-
ment of a bilateral policy on this matter was 
not the only issue covered in the Colombian-
us relationship. Just like drug trafficking, 
human rights took relevant importance for 
governing elites and foreign policy makers in 
Capitol Hill (Department of State, 1994a). 
The topic acquired such relevance that the 
American Embassy in Bogota launched the 
Human Rights Coordinating Committee 
(hrcc) in December 1993, giving it a “…
much higher profile in the context of the us-
goc [Government of Colombia] bilateral rela-
tions” (Department of State, 1994a). Equally, 
the pressure generated by the international 
civil society, multilateral organizations, and 
the us, made “…improving the police and 
military’s human rights record a key goc goal” 
(p. 2). According to the Department of State 
(p. 2), this was epitomized by the Samper 
administration’s “…willingness to re-open 
formerly closed investigation[s] such as the 
Caloto and Trujillo massacres…”, as well as 
official recognition of the role of vigilance that 
human rights activists can play in this field 
(Department of State, 1994b, p. 2).
According to the Department of State 
(1994b), the us government designed a strate-
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gy based on four approximations towards pro-
moting respect of human rights and compli-
ance from Colombia’s security sector agents. 
This approach stated first the necessity of 
providing education and training in human 
rights and international humanitarian law to 
selected officers in the military and police. 
Second, it imposed a system of combating 
impunity through the banning of cooperation 
with military units accused of human rights 
violations while conducting an aggressive 
monitoring program over those who benefit 
from us military aid. Third, it emphasized 
to the Colombian government the central-
ity of human rights as the most important 
mainstay of us foreign policy. Finally, it com-
manded the Colombian government to keep 
the “…Washington interagency community 
informed on human rights developments…” 
either negative or positive, “…in order to deal 
more effectively with us congressional and 
ngo interlocutors” (p. 7).
Certainly, the top priority given to hu-
man rights in the bilateral Colombian-us 
relationship deeply influenced the States’ 
policy of the Andean country, going beyond 
the political interests of the incumbent admin-
istration, while propelling ssr changes in the 
Colombian military. All this was directed at 
constructing vigilant bodies with regard to the 
activities of government agents. In this fash-
ion, the Andres Pastrana presidency (1998-
2002) granted a major place to human rights 
in its governmental agenda, by drafting a 
global plan to enhance the human rights situ-
ation of the country. This task was assigned to 
Vice-president Gustavo Bell, who also received 
the title of Human Rights High Counsellor 
(Pastrana, 1998). In order to make the plan 
come to fruition, Bell proposed the develop-
ment of a sustained lobby in the Colombian 
Congress directed at supporting the approval 
of a truly “…needed military reform and other 
human rights legislation…”, insisting as well, 
that “…human rights abusing security force 
members...” were to be judged by civilian 
courts (American Embassy Bogota, 1998).
These advancements in human rights 
legislation and military institutional behav-
ior were issued in Law 522 of 1999, which 
created a new military justice law according 
to the tougher standards asked by the inter-
national community and the us (Congreso 
de Colombia, 1999). With the purpose of 
reinforcing such compromises and sending a 
political message about the commitment of 
Colombia with respect to human rights, the 
Pastrana administration ratified the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court 
in 2002 (Semana, 2002).
Undoubtedly, this policy produced the 
expected results, since it reduced, according 
to the us Southern Command, the extrajudi-
cial assassinations adjudicated to the security 
forces from 54% in 1993 to 2% in 1999 (us 
Southern Command, 1999). However, illegal 
armed groups maintained their regular levels 
of violence and abuses to human rights (us 
Southern Command, 1999). Likewise, im-
punity was notorious during that time, being 
calculated at 97% in 1999 (us Southern Com-
mand, 1999). However, such positive results 
with regard to government agents were unable 
to create a solid basis that would prevent fu-
ture violations to Human Rights perpetrated 
by certain sectors of the military forces.
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Even though the stress on the defense of 
human rights was a sin e qua non condition 
for receiving military aid, denouncements 
of extrajudicial killings (better known in the 
media as “falsos positivos” -false positives-) 
committed by members of the Colombian 
Army started to be more recurrent in human 
rights activist circles and in the ombudsman 
office in the 2000’s. By September 2008, the 
government of Alvaro Uribe had to recognize 
in national media that some youths of Soacha, 
a suburb located in the outskirts of Bogota, 
were executed by army members and reported 
as guerrilla combatants. According to Human 
Rights Watch, the Office of the Attorney 
General of Colombia is currently investigating 
more than 3,000 possible cases perpetrated 
between 2002 and 2008. Nowadays, over 800 
members of the Army have been prosecuted 
and convicted (Human Rights Watch, 2015).
During this time, the influx of us military 
aid was neither interrupted nor decreased until 
2007 according to the ngo Fellowship of Rec-
onciliation (for). The research concluded that 
“…reported extrajudicial killings increased 
on average in areas after the United States 
increased assistance to units in those areas” 
(Fellowship of Reconciliation, 2014). Changes 
in Capitol Hill from Republican to Democrat 
majorities in 2006 “…gave voice and power 
to critics of us policy in Colombia…”, while 
the Free Trade Agreement between Colombia 
and the US was due to be ratified. This situa-
tion was followed by a decrease of us military 
aid by “…more than $200 million in 2007, 
effective in 2008” ( p. 31).
Local measures were applied by the Min-
istry of Defense in order to correct the internal 
mechanisms that underpinned the “falsos 
postivos”. In this sense, the General Com-
mand of the Military Forces issued Permanent 
Directive No. 208, which issued 15 measures 
in regard to military instruction, doctrine, 
intelligence, operations, administrative and 
disciplinary control, planning, command re-
sponsibility, cooperation with judicial authori-
ties and attention to the population’s demands 
(Ministerio de Defensa, 2010). This series of 
changes and policy implementations express 
the ssr answer at a local level, which propelled 
positive transformations in intelligence ser-
vices through the issue of Law 1288 of 2009 
(Minsiterio de Defensa, 2010), and the hu-
man rights field in the Colombian military. In 
sum, this gave impulse to the Army and the 
Navy to create the operational legal advisors 
in 2007 and 2008 respectively, having been 
preceded by the Colombian Air Force, who 
was the pioneer in such legal advancement in 
2004 (Ministerio de Defensa, 2013).
the WAr on drUgs And the WAr on 
terror (1998-2002): the profoUnd 
trAnsformAtion of colombiAn 
defense
The election of Andres Pastrana (1998-
2002) as head of the Colombian government 
in 1998 was characterized by a serious situ-
ation of security and economic crisis, which 
affected all sectors of the State. The economy 
shrank for the first time since 1931, an effect 
accompanied by a growing weakness of the 
Colombian financial sector; levels of unem-
ployment close to 20 percent; fiscal deficit; 
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and devaluation of the national currency 
(the Colombian peso) (Department of State, 
1999). This situation acquired worrisome 
parameters due to a more offensive stand of 
Colombian guerrillas, especially the farc in-
surgents, who were operating in large forma-
tions, multiple fronts, and mobile columns, 
thus, showing an evolution “...from merely 
small hit and run guerrilla-style attacks to 
sophisticated operations using intelligence, 
maneuvers, indirect fire, and command and 
control of multiple units that mass on the 
target” (Department of Defense, 1999, pág. 
9). In this macro-context, the Pastrana ad-
ministration carried out a peace negotiation 
with the farc guerrillas spanning three years 
after November 1998, in a demilitarized zone 
of 42.000 km2 known as Despeje (Crandall, 
2002), while at the same time, they advanced 
in a massive diplomatic effort for defense that 
transformed the Colombian security sector: 
Plan Colombia.
This panorama was the engine that in-
spired the Pastrana administration to draw an 
institutional blueprint to enhance military, 
social, and judicial spheres in Colombia, in 
order to deal with the multiple crises that 
faced the country. According to President 
Pastrana, the cost of the program would be 
close to $7.5 billion us dollars, requiring not 
just the aid from the us, but also help from 
other nations. Plan Colombia was aimed at 
reinforcing Colombian offensive capabilities 
in the coca growing regions in the south of the 
country, which were dominated by insurgents. 
Equally important was the strengthening of 
coca eradication and alternative economic 
activities for rural farmers dedicated to har-
vesting illegal crops. All these strategies were 
complemented by augmenting the protection 
and respect of Human Rights and the rule 
of law (Department of State, 2000). How-
ever, even though it was widely known that 
a relationship between guerrillas and drug 
trafficking existed, the us stressed that the 
main objective of Plan Colombia was coun-
ternarcotic operations, not counterinsurgency 
(Department of State, 2000a).
According to the National Planning 
Department of Colombia, Plan Colombia 
allowed for the acquisition and moderniza-
tion of technical endowments and equipment, 
professionalizing members of security institu-
tions and, improving mobility and logistics of 
military forces (Departamento Nacional de 
Planeación, 2006). At the same time, it in-
troduced the concept of joint operations, em-
phasized earlier in 1992 in bilateral meetings 
between Minister of Defense Rafael Pardo, 
and the us embassy delegation (American 
Embassy Bogota, 1992).
In terms of stricter human rights con-
trols, the aid to battalions was tied to their 
Human Rights record, hence, those accused 
of violations would not receive any aid at all. 
Additionally, training in investigation and 
prosecution of crimes against human rights 
was offered to public officials. On a diplo-
matic level, the us government pressured 
Colombian authorities to take appropriate 
measures against actors who violated hu-
man rights without regard to their standing 
of being either military forces, guerrillas, or 
paramilitaries (Department of State, 2000a).
These controls were also in agreement 
with the Leahy amendment, a law that set 
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human rights conditions on us military aid, 
and which has evaluated Colombia’s record 
since 1997. The amendment forbids counter-
narcotic aid towards military units accused of 
grave violations of human rights (Gloobal, 
2016). This sort of certification can be seen 
as a foreign policy instrument of statecraft, 
aimed at enhancing human rights standards 
and behavior of military forces, with the 
participation of institutional and civil society 
mechanisms of vigilance (Serafino, Beittel, 
Ploch & Rosen, 2014). Under this schema, the 
us Congress blocked $30 million us dollars of 
military aid from being given to the Army and 
the National Police of Colombia in July 1997 
(El Tiempo, 1997). It also helped to prevent 
the giving of military aid to a Colombian Air 
Force unit in January 2003, due to the unit’s 
“…lack of responsiveness and progress on an 
important human rights case” (Simons, 2003).
Apart from such behavioral checks, the 
limitation of Plan Colombia with respect to 
counternarcotic activities made its applica-
tion by the State over all illegal armed groups 
a complicated issue that gave the upper hand 
to the latter over the former. This hindered 
military forces’ capability to counterbalance 
offensive actions of the farc insurgents, who, 
amid the peace talks, continued exerting 
control over some “…rural areas, destroying 
powerlines, establishing major roadblocks, 
and attacking isolated police garrisons” (Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency, 2000, p. 7).
By September 2000, the farc guerrillas 
executed an armed strike directed at boycot-
ting local elections, Plan Colombia, and in 
opposition to the paramilitary territorial 
incursions in the department of Putumayo. 
All this triggered a massive displacement of 
about 5,000 people, who at the same time 
alleged that the guerrillas were pushing them 
to take arms against the us aid in Putumayo 
(American Embassy Bogota, 2000).
Meanwhile, the Colombian government 
was consolidating diplomatic efforts to per-
suade its counterpart in Washington to allow 
the use of all components of the Plan Colom-
bia in the war on insurgency. This argument 
was articulated as a general claim from high 
officers in the Colombian military forces, 
with regard to modernizing and professional-
izing its equipment, policies, practices, and 
human capital. To all these demands, the us 
also suggested changes in the military judicial 
code, recruitment, and terms of service, as 
well as intelligence, personnel management, 
and logistics (Department of Defense, 2001).
In this environment of proposals and 
adjustments in the security sector, some of 
them being readily undertaken, the “Gato 
Negro” (Black Cat) operation was devel-
oped in Barrancominas-Guainía, which was 
directed mainly at proving the links of farc 
guerrillas with narco-trafficking. The results 
of the operation were successful, since the 
Brazilian drug lord Fernandinho Beira Mar 
was captured, thus, proving the effectiveness 
of both joint operations and innovations 
introduced thanks to Plan Colombia. The 
“Gato Negro” offensive was the best proof 
of the farc’s links to cocaine trafficking and 
with Latin American criminal organizations, 
especially those rooted in Paraguay, Brazil, 
and Surinam (Semana, 2001).
In response to this military action, the 
farc tried to gain control again over Bar-
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rancominas; however, the military forces 
launched the “7 de Agosto” (August 7th) 
operation against a structure of about 1,300 
insurgents in Guaviare, in which “Urías Cuel-
lar”, the most important military leader of the 
subversive group after “Mono Jojoy” was neu-
tralized (American Embassy Bogota, 2001). 
Certainly, both operations “Gato Negro” and 
“7 de Agosto” proved that the security sector 
in Colombia was in a positive transformation 
in its technical resources, human resources, 
and doctrine, since, before Plan Colombia ac-
cording to the us analysts, it was not possible 
for the Colombian military forces “…to move 
over 3,000 troops in 48 hours to the combat 
zone” (American Embassy Bogota, 2001, p. 
4). Equally important, was that both opera-
tions were carried out jointly in a coordinated 
and interagency manner with the participation 
of about 4,000 soldiers of elite units being 
transported in “Arpía” (Black-Hawk) and the 
mi2 helicopters, while they were supported by 
ov-10 Bronco and Tucano aircraft (El Nuevo 
Herald, 2001).
In this context, the Bush administra-
tion had to deal with the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001, an event that pushed 
the us towards enacting a global antiterror-
ist policy which in turn had implications for 
Colombian defense policy. This became the 
tipping point of the us-Colombia relationship 
in terms of Plan Colombia, since it integrated 
a new approach towards Colombian security 
issues by acknowledging that narcotics and 
terrorism were interrelated problems (Depart-
ment of State, December 2001). This major 
change helped to propel the necessary lobby 
on Capitol Hill for allowing Plan Colombia 
resources and equipment to be used for more 
than antinarcotic issues, with some conditions 
such as obtaining positive results in the War 
on Drugs, progressive human rights records, 
and the design of a self-help financial approach 
to sustain the military budget (Department 
of State, 2002).
Such momentum for the ssr in Colom-
bia in the early 2000’s was met by the end of 
the Despeje in February 2002, which caused 
great levels of frustration in Colombian pub-
lic opinion. This factor was well used by the 
independent candidate Alvaro Uribe Velez, 
who was elected president a wide majority 
in the polls. For the us, Alvaro Uribe showed 
an authentic willingness to compromise with 
an aggressive antinarcotic strategy based on 
increasing the number of troops; the estab-
lishment of a wide intelligence network and, 
finally, the development of a self-help finan-
cial approach to sustain the military budget 
(American Embassy Bogota, 2002). In this 
sense, the acquisition of $6.2 billion dollars in 
a four-year period was crucial, a difficult task 
that was met by the appointment of Roberto 
Junguito as Minister of Finance who was in 
charge of creating a fiscal and tax reform to 
get the required funds for the Democratic 
Security program (Colombia.com, 2002).
Hence, Capitol Hill in October 30, 2002, 
authorized for the first time the use of Plan 
Colombia resources and equipment in anti-
2 Russian helicopter manufactured by Mil Moscow Helicopter Plant (MI).
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terrorist and counterinsurgency operations 
(Calvo, 2008), a major adjustment that gave 
great impetus to ssr in the Andean country, 
giving the upper hand to the Colombian 
government over the farc insurgents in the 
mid-2000’s. This was also a key factor in the 
development of Plan Patriota, as well as other 
crucial advancements in intelligence and 
precision air attacks that turned the internal 
conflict in favor of the State.
On the other hand, ssr in the Plan Co-
lombia stage did not gravitate only toward 
the enhancement of military institutions, it 
was also highly important in the transition to 
a new accusatory criminal justice system that 
relied on us suggestions and experiences of its 
own system (us Government Accountability 
Office, 2008). In this scenario, military aid 
came to reinforce infrastructure and technol-
ogy, planning and management models, and 
the enhancement of criminal investigation 
(Departamento Nacional de Planeación, 
2006). All these factors were complementary 
measures adopted in the military field, aimed 
at coping with major issues of insecurity, 
criminality and internal conflict.
This series of changes did not merely obey 
the security interests of the us in Colombia 
in terms of the War on Drugs, but also, pro-
moted a whole rationale of spreading liberal 
values and reinforcing democracy as a way of 
favoring us national security. In this sense, 
ssr becomes a tool of us statecraft directed 
at helping “…create a world of democratic, 
well-governed States that can meet the needs 
of their citizens and conduct themselves re-
sponsibly in the international system” (usaid, 
dod, dos, 2009, p. 2). All this is addressed 
toward a bigger objective: to “…reduce long 
term threats to U.S. security by helping to 
build stable, prosperous, and peaceful societies 
beyond…” us borders (, p. 2).
After the terrorist attacks in the us, the 
advance of the War on Terror found a moral 
objective similar to those expressed in the 
Wilsonian idealism, which has served as 
the primary guide of us foreign policy. By 
2006, the us National Security Strategy stat-
ed that “…the United States must defend 
liberty and justice…these non-negotiable 
demands of human dignity are protected 
most securely in democracies” (The White 
House, 2006). Similar speeches and argu-
ments were present in the Colombian politi-
cal realm, which interpreted guerrilla warfare 
as a threat against the democratic order and 
the rule of law, sponsored by narco-terrorism 
(Uribe, 2010).
These developments added new justifica-
tions and elements to understand and shape 
defense measures to address the Colombian 
conflict, as well as reinforce security as a 
central element to favor the State’s economy, 
society and constitutional order. The relation 
of military cooperation between the US and 
Colombia, can be seen as a sort of economic 
inducement which involves “…commercial 
concessions, technology transfers, and other 
economic carrots that are extended by a 
sender in exchange for political compliance 
on the part of a target” (Blanchard, Mans-
field & Ripsman, 2000, p. 1). This approach 
to ssr in the case of Colombia, in regard to 
the policy of Democratic Security, was not 
just directed towards recuperating order and 
security as the basis of liberty and Human 
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Rights guarantees, but also, as principles to 
bolster economic growth and cope with illegal 
industries (Presidencia de la República, 2003).
Notwithstanding, not all reforms advo-
cated by us policy makers were implemented. 
Accountability of security and intelligence 
institutions by civilian instances has not been 
put in practice completely. This relationship is 
not just limited to vigilance of security institu-
tions; it is as well a source of “political learn-
ing”3 emanating from civil society. According 
to Bruneau (2005, p. 239), “…there was not 
until late 2003 a single university program, 
nor a single think-tank, nor a single ngo that 
[dealt] with security, defense, or civil-military 
relations” in Colombia.
Another issue comes from the political 
governing elites represented in the Colombian 
Congress since they have been historically 
apathetic towards security and defense mat-
ters. This phenomenon is rooted in the late 
1950’s, when division of tasks was agreed upon 
between the security forces and bureaucrats. 
Hence, “…the civilians would take care of 
government, including economic and social 
policy, and the military (including the police) 
would take care of national security and de-
fense” (Bruneau, 2005). Therefore, civilians 
isolated themselves from security and defense 
dimensions of the State, leaving them almost 
entirely to the hands of military forces and the 
executive branch to this day. In consequence, 
“…the roles of the legislature in policy defini-
tion, budget development, and oversight are 
minimal” (Bruneau, 2005).
Such a scenario seems to be backed by 
widespread apathy from civil society in re-
gard to political matters. The plebiscite of 
October 2nd, 2016, which sought to give 
political legitimacy to the Government of 
Colombia-farc peace agreement, registered 
the highest abstention rate in 22 years with 
62% (El Tiempo, 2016b). This shows the 
difficulty of articulating to civil society the 
need for defense architecture and vigilance 
since citizens’ political will and awareness are 
absent and promises to be so in the near and 
mid-term future.
However, some initiatives have been ad-
vanced in terms of linking political parties to 
defense oversight bodies. The “Comisión Legal 
de Seguimiento de las Actividades de Inteli-
gencia y Contrainteligencia” (Legal Commis-
sion of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 
Activities Tracing), which is formed by eight 
congressmen with representation of opposi-
tion political parties, and created by Law 1621 
of 2013 that regulates intelligence activities is 
an example of such trend. Another new orga-
nization created by the intelligence law is the 
“Comisión Asesora para la Depuración de los 
Datos y Archivos de Inteligencia y Contrain-
teligencia” (Assessing Commission for Data, 
Intelligence and Counterintelligence Archives 
3 Political learning is the kind of knowledge developed by civil society organizations which are aimed at enhancing 
institutions and processes. In the case of Colombia, “…the creation of institutions, be they universities, think-tanks 
or non-governmental organizations (ngos) [has been minimized], which could allow them [Colombian society and 
institutions] to get together to learn from one another and basically generate political learning” (Bruneau, 2005, 
pp. 238-239).
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Depuration), in charge of reviewing archiving 
policies and coming up with recommenda-
tions for improvements, with participation 
by one representative from civil society and 
one from the Attorney General of Colombia 
(Congreso de Colombia, 2013).
conclUsion: bAlAnce of the ssr in 
colombiA since the mid-1990’s to 
the eArly 2000’s, And prospective 
scenArios After A peAce Agreement 
With the fArc gUerrillAs
Colombia has been facing several se-
curity issues that challenge its institutional 
shape, and the political, economic, and social 
dimensions of the State. In this context, the 
different ssr efforts have been underpinned by 
the establishment ever since the mid-1990’s, 
but all of them were inspired by us models 
and dependent on military aid. In this sense, 
it is possible to recognize two stages: firstly, 
they mainly stressed the War on Drugs, and 
the respect for human rights and, secondly, 
they underlined the transition from the War 
on Drugs to the War on Terror.
From the mid to the late 1990’s the Co-
lombian State had some of the most serious 
negative human rights records; these viola-
tions were perpetrated by different armed 
groups in the country: guerrillas, paramili-
taries, National Police, and military forces. 
In this landscape, the illegal industry of drug 
trafficking was widespread, affecting security 
and reinforcing subversive groups. These fac-
tors presented trans-border issues that trig-
gered a deeper military cooperation between 
Colombia and the us, propelling the ssr in 
an early stage toward participating in the War 
on Drugs and toward stricter standards of 
respecting human rights.
Such advances helped to categorize hu-
man rights as a State policy, with full recog-
nition of their important role in the political 
agenda of us-Colombia bilateral relations. 
Even though the military forces and the Na-
tional Police of Colombia greatly reduced 
their indexes of abuses and violations, illegal 
armed groups kept the number of disappear-
ances and assassinations high, and even more 
so in the case of paramilitary groups. During 
this period, civil servants were trained as part 
of the agreements with the us, in investigat-
ing and prosecuting human rights violations. 
Equally relevant was the reform of military 
justice law, which answered to the interests 
of respecting human rights from us decision 
makers and international civil society.
However, by 2008 the apparent positive 
advancements in regard to respect of human 
rights suffered a huge regression due to the 
scandal of “falsos positivos”. This situation in 
which army members’ inflated operational 
results by committing extrajudicial executions 
that were then reported as neutralized guerrilla 
combatants in operations greatly affected the 
legitimacy of security institutions.
In terms of the War on Drugs, there was 
an early ssr doctrine variant which introduced 
the concept of joint and coordinated opera-
tions in 1992, thanks to bilateral meetings 
between the Colombian Ministry of Defense 
and us embassy experts. The principal ob-
jective of this initiative was to interrupt the 
influx of illegal drugs into the us, by devel-
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oping an active policy of aerial interdiction, 
and the support of the Colombian Air Force 
to Colombian Army and Navy operations. 
However, all the military efforts rooted in a 
package of reforms and foreign military aid 
were limited to the War on Drugs.
By 1998, with the election of Andres Pas-
trana as president, the Colombian government 
spent its political capital in the peace negotia-
tion of the Despeje with the farc guerrillas. 
At the same time, they were advancing in a 
major plan of social and military investment 
named Plan Colombia. This ssr effort served 
to positively change the doctrine, equipment, 
policy, human capital and technical dimen-
sions of the military forces and the National 
Police of Colombia, but with a clear War on 
Drugs connotation that later gained an anti-
terrorist stress.
These changes put into practice the earlier 
concept of joint and coordinated operations 
to counterbalance the farc’s offensive over 
urban centers and isolated garrisons. The 
“Gato Negro” and “7 de Agosto” operations 
served to prove the new capabilities of the Co-
lombian military forces against strategic and 
operational changes executed by the guerrillas 
who operated in great numbers that massed 
on the target.
Certainly, such a transformation, given 
the United States-Colombia bilateral relations, 
helped to structure a new military apparatus 
in Colombia, with great mobility, equipment, 
and offensive capability. In this sense, those 
developments created a strong foundation for 
the defense sector in the mid-2000’s and up to 
this day by supporting technical intelligence, 
precision airstrikes, and the presence of the 
Colombian Public Force in places where the 
 guerrillas used to exert some kind of control. 
However, all this was possible thanks to the 
political changes in Washington, once the 
War on Terror was linked locally in Colom-
bia to the counterinsurgency def ense policy 
after the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 
2001 in the us.
prospective scenArios After  
A peAce Agreement With the fArc
Undoubtedly, the advent of a new stage 
of ssr that overcomes the counterinsurgent 
doctrine which has ruled Colombian military 
institutions so far might be highly possible if 
a successful agreement between the Govern-
ment of Colombia and the farc is achieved. 
In this scenario, the persistence of some illegal 
groups, and the change to post-conflict poli-
cies that come from the establishment, are the 
two main challenges faced by the Colombian 
security sector.
A key aspect of ssr in a post-conflict stage 
in the short run is the redefinition of national 
defense objectives. Once the farc subversives 
agree to disarm, demobilize, work on reinser-
tion and reintegration (ddrr) mechanisms, as 
well as participate politically, the main strate-
gic threat to Colombia will be overcome. This 
perspective might leave unclear the system of 
defense and security of Colombia in doctrinal, 
operative, and tactical terms. In this context, 
the key aspects of a new model of reforms 
in the security sector depend on old persis-
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tent threats, such as the eln4 insurgents and 
criminal bands (bacrim), who might recruit 
demobilized farc members and dissidents 
frustrated with the peace accords. In order to 
cope with these menaces, security apparatus 
need to be supported by a coherent judicial 
and legal system that protects military opera-
tions in the absence of a law for security and 
national defense.
Regarding political innovations from 
the central government in addressing peace 
consolidation and security, the Colombian 
Public Force needs to interpret those scenarios 
accurately in order to articulate inner struc-
tural innovations that meet the new political, 
historical and social requirements. Under 
this parameter, the creation of departments 
which understand the operational and politi-
cal levels of the ssr reforms in a post-conflict 
environment are indispensable. All of this has 
started to take place already through different 
military platforms, such as the Committee of 
Strategic Renovation and Innovation of the 
Public Force (crei). The dynamic political 
environment suggests new fields to take into 
account in the armed forces; for example, 
issues like historical memory that might 
reinforce the legitimacy of Public Forces in 
the future, are part of the new dimensions of 
post-conflict reform.
The institutional changes in the Co-
lombian establishment could be a source of 
transformations in the military apparatus as 
well. The new Ministry of Post-conflict and 
the management of the General Strategy of 
Construction of Peace Conditions (egcp) 
might generate shock actions to guarantee the 
accomplishment of the agreements reached in 
the peace accord. The chief objective of the 
egcp, which according to Guáqueta (2015), 
Vice-minister of Post-conflict, is aimed at 
executing a series of measures in terms of 
justice, security, development, governability 
and communication during the first eighteen 
months after the culmination of the peace ac-
cord. Certainly, all these policies will condi-
tion the room to maneuver and the primary 
functions of the defense sector, even more in 
topics such as ddrr, land restitution, secu-
rity and consolidation of the territories left 
by the farc guerrillas, and the security of the 
farc ex-combatants who decide to partici-
pate politically in national, regional, or local 
democratic platforms.
The defeat of the plebiscite that was try-
ing to grant political legitimization to the 
Colombian government-farc peace agree-
ment halted its implementation, with the dif-
ference that the ssr process in the Colombian 
military continues. The reform in the military 
4 It should be noted that, on March 30, 2016, the government delegates and the eln announced the start of 
peace talks. In this regard, this is a different process to what is happening with the farc, especially because of the 
political-ideological character that manages the eln. These dialogues certainly will be a step closer to achieving 
peace in Colombia, but it will also produce a mutation of the armed conflict toward the cities, as well as an increase 
of Organized Armed Groups (oag) or Criminal Bands, both a product of redoubts and the participation of former 
members of farc and eln.
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forces does not depend expressly on a situa-
tion of post-conflict with the farc, since the 
reforms are in part immersed in the objective 
of internationalization of Colombian security 
institutions and the strengthening of defense 
cooperation with the us. In a prospective sce-
nario ssr changes will be strengthened if the 
peace accord is implemented in the near future 
by either the Colombian Congress, Presiden-
tial mandate after signing a new agreement, or 
through a second plebiscite after achieving a 
political solution with opposition sectors (El 
Colombiano, 2016).
Several blueprints of ssr changes in the 
military forces have been developed recently, 
and they are in the process of being consoli-
dated. An example of this is the Damascus 
Doctrine launched in mid-2016, and whose 
objective is to give the Colombian Army a 
profile and tasks closer to the social paradigm 
of human security (El Tiempo, 2016a). Ac-
cording to General Alberto Mejía, “… [The] 
troops’ mission will go further than that of 
granting security, to put themselves to the 
service of communities” (El Tiempo, 2016a). 
This kind of advancement, the international-
ization of military forces and tighter human 
rights standards, are variables of defense im-
provements that overcame the political scenar-
io of the peace agreement of the Colombian 
government with the farc, and that promises 
to deepen if it is implemented successfully.
Public forces in Colombia have been in 
a constant process of enhancement due to the 
internal situation of conflict. Institutional 
advancement, personnel training, technology, 
doctrine and equipment have been placed in 
a better offensive and defensive standing for 
the military apparatus, helping the Colom-
bian government to take the initiative against 
the guerrillas. The effective application of 
the peace agreement with the farc guerrilla 
(and eventually with the eln) would open a 
new scenario of military reform, whose most 
important characteristic would be its interna-
tionalization through both multilateral and 
bilateral platforms.
In terms of multilateral platforms, Co-
lombia signed its first agreement with the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (nato) 
in June 2013, with the purpose of generating 
cooperation in areas of information, transpar-
ency, anticorruption, and humanitarian and 
peace operations (El Tiempo, 2013). In this 
regard, the announcement of Colombian par-
ticipation in other countries has been growing 
along with the expectations of post-conflict 
in Colombia. General Alberto Jose Mejia, the 
Commander of the Army, stated in July 2016 
that about 5,000 members of the Army will 
be sent to peace missions in Africa and the 
Middle East in the next two years (Caracol Ra-
dio, 2016). Something similar was previously 
expressed in 2015 in New York by President 
Juan Manuel Santos, when he argued that 
Colombia was ready to share with the world 
its successful experience and knowledge in the 
fight against terrorism, drug trafficking and 
transnational crime (Presidencia de la Repub-
lica, 2015). In order to give legal ground to 
such an endeavor, a framework agreement be-
tween the Government of Colombia and the 
United Nations (un) has been signed directed 
at regulating the contributions of Colombia 
to the un system of forces for peacekeeping 
operations (Congreso de Colombia, 2016).
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Regarding bilateral platforms, Colombia 
has already developed relations with forces of 
countries that face similar challenges. In this 
area, the cooperation is related with training 
and the transmission of Colombian know-
how in topics such as the War on Drugs, 
counterinsurgency and anti-kidnapping. It is 
possible to trace some records to 2006, when 
the National Police of Colombia sent a team 
of advisors to study the situation of drug traf-
ficking in Afghanistan and give an assessment 
to its authorities (Dinero, 2006). Even before 
that, since 1989, the Jungle Command of 
the Colombian Police was already training 
policemen of countries such as Peru, Bolivia, 
Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Honduras, Costa 
Rica, Panama, Brazil, Argentina, Afghanistan 
and México in counternarcotics operations 
(Diálogo, 2015). In addition to such coop-
erative efforts, the General Commander of 
the Colombian military forces, Juan Pablo 
Rodriguez Barragan, travelled to Bucharest, 
Rumania, to a nato high meeting, in order to 
widen the scenarios where Colombia might 
share its experiences on fighting terrorism 
and transnational crime. For nato, the Co-
lombian model and strategy in dealing with 
these issues has been successful (El Especta-
dor, 2016), which can be a positive input for 
both regional and global security architecture.
Once such developments are observed, 
it is possible to assume that the Colombian 
military has already been internationalized 
to a certain degree and that such a process 
might be deepened under a post-conflict sce-
nario with ssr. In this sense, it is going to be 
possible to advance in initiatives that include 
the us, in a scheme of triangulated military 
cooperation. Under this concept, “Colombia 
with us backing could provide other countries 
with security cooperation at a greatly reduced 
economic expense, and without the political 
costs associated with an enlarged us military 
presence” (Tickner, 2014). In this scenario, 
capability building in states with weak se-
curity institutions, and the spread of liberal 
and democratic values abroad, might become 
additional tasks for the Colombian military if 
this model is consolidated in a post-conflict 
stage. Some experiences have already been 
undertaken in terms of counternarcotics, or-
ganized crime, strengthening of institutions, 
and citizen security mainly in Guatemala, El 
Salvador, Honduras and Panama (Ministerio 
de Defensa, 2015).
references
American Embassy Bogota (1992). goc to begin wit-
ting [sic] narcs on all fronts. Bogota: National 
Security Archive.
American Embassy Bogota (1998). Colombia unveils 
human rights plan. Bogota: National Security 
Archive.
American Embassy Bogota (2000). What is the farc up to 
in Putumayo? Bogota: National Security Archive.
American Embassy Bogota (2001). Operation Seventh 
of August Winds Down. Bogota: National Secu-
rity Archive.
American Embassy Bogota (2002). Key bilateral issues 
and president-elect Uribe’s Washington visit. Bo-
gota: National Security Archive.
Blanchard, J. M. F., Mansfield, E. D. & Ripsman, N. 
M. (2000). The political economy of national 
security: economic statecraft, interdependence, 
52
O P E R A ,  N o  2 0  •  E n e r o - J u n i o  2 0 1 7  •  p p .  3 5 - 5 4
J a v i e r  A l b e r t o  C a s t r i l l ó n  R i a s c o s ,  R e n é  A l o n s o  G u e r r a  M o l i n a
and international conflict. In Blanchard, J. M. 
F., Mansfield, E. D. & Ripsman, N. M. (eds.). 
Power and the Purse (pp. 1-14). New York: 
Routledge.
Bruneau, T. C. (2005). The military in post-conflict 
societies: lessons from Central. America and 
prospects for Colombia. In Schnabel, A. & 
Ehrhart, H. G. Security Sector Reform and Post-
Conflict Peacebuilding. Tokyo: United Nations 
University Press.
Calvo, H. (2008). Colombia, laboratorio de embrujos. 
Democracia y terrorismo de Estado. Madrid: Foca.
Caracol Radio (2016). Tropas del Ejército, a misiones de 
paz en África y Medio Oriente. Retrieved from 
http://caracol.com.co/radio/2016/07/21/nacio-
nal/1469119249_245118.html
Central Intelligence Agency (2000). The dci strategic 
warning committee’s watchlist supplement. Lang-
ley: National Security Archive.
Chernick, M. (2012). Acuerdo posible: solución nego-
ciada al conflicto armado colombiano. Bogota: 
Ediciones aurora.
Colombia.com. (2002). Tras el impuesto al patrimonio. 
Retrieved from http://www.colombia.com/noti-
cias/autonoticias/2002/DetalleNoticia17133.asp
Congreso de Colombia (1999). Código Penal Militar. 
Retrieved from http://www.secretariasenado.
gov.co/senado/basedoc/ley_0522_1999.html
Congreso de Colombia (2013). Ley No. 1621 del 




Congreso de Colombia (2016). Ley No. 1794 del 




Crandall, R. (2002). Driven by drugs: US policy toward 
Colombia. London: Lynne Rienner Publisher.
Departamento Nacional de Planeación (2006). Balance 
Plan Colombia 1999-2005. Bogota: Departa-
mento Nacional de Planeación.
Department of Defense (1999). Colombia’s insurgency: 
military implications from Las Delicias to Mitu. 
Virginia: National Security Archive.
Department of Defense (2001). dma bilateral meeting: 
Colombia mod Luis Fernando Ramírez. Virginia: 
National Security Archive.
Department of State (1994a). Meeting with President 
Samper. Washington: National Security Archive.
Department of State (1994b). Updated human rights 
action plan. Washington: National Security 
Archive.
Department of State (1999). Colombian gordian knot. 
Washington: National Security Archive.
Department of State (2000a). Proposed U.S. Assistance 
package for colombia announced. Washington: 
National Security Archive.
Department of State (2000b). The goc’s first look at 
Plan Colombia . Wahsington: National Secu-
rity Archive.
Department of State (2001). Enhancing our counter-
terrorism strategy for Colombia. Washington: 
National Security Archive.
Department of State (2002). Colombia--Démarche on 
the way ahead. Washington: National Security 
Archive.
Diálogo (2015). Fuerzas Armadas colombianas entrenan 




Dinero (2006). Colombia asesora a Afganistán en lu-
cha contra las drogas. Retrieved from http://
www.dinero.com/actualidad/noticias/articulo/
53
O P E R A ,  N o  2 0  •  E n e r o - J u n i o  2 0 1 7  •  p p .  3 5 - 5 4
A  d e e p  i n f l u e n c e :  U n i t e d  S t a t e s - C o l o m b i a  b i l a t e r a l  r e l a t i o n s  a n d  s e c u r i t y  s e c t o r  r e f o r m
colombia-asesora-afganistan-lucha-contra-dro-
gas/35083
El Colombiano (2016). Santos dice que buscará salida 





El Espectador (2016). Colombia participó por primera 




El Nuevo Herald (2001). Cae un jefe de las farc. Re-
trieved from http://www.latinamericanstudies.
org/farc/farc-jefe.htm
El Tiempo (1997). Amnistía respalda a gobierno de E.U. 
Retrieved from http://www.eltiempo.com/ar-
chivo/documento/mam-613720
El Tiempo (2013). Colombia firma primer acuerdo con 
la Otán. Retrieved from http://www.eltiempo.
com/archivo/documento/cms-12894748
El Tiempo (2016a). La del plebiscito fue la mayor ab-
stención en 22 años. Retrieved from http://www.
eltiempo.com/politica/proceso-de-paz/absten-
cion-en-el-plebiscito-por-la-paz/16716874
El Tiempo (2016b). Las claves de ‘Damasco’, la nueva 
doctrina del Ejército. Retrieved from http://www.
eltiempo.com/politica/justicia/como-es-la-nue-
va-doctrina-del-ejercito-de-colombia/16666265
Fellowship of Reconciliation (2014a). Report: Military 
assistance and human rights: Colombia, us ac-




Fellowship of Reconciliation (2014b). The rise and fall 
of “false positive” killings in Colombia: the role of 
us military assistance, 2000-2010. Retrieved from 
http://archives.forusa.org/sites/default/files/up-
loads/false-positives-2014-colombia-report.pdf




Guáqueta, A. (2015). Comité de renovación estratégica 
e innovación (crei 4). Bogota: Minsiterio de 
Defensa Nacional y Comando General Fuerzas 
Militares.
Human Rights Watch (2015). El rol de los altos mandos 
en falsos positivos. Washington: Human Rights 
Watch.
Minsiterio de Defensa (2010). Avances en el cumplimien-
to de las 15 medidas adoptadas por el Minsiterio de 





Ministerio de Defensa (2013). Boletín correo de la oda 




Ministerio de Defensa (2015). Diplomacia para la seguri-
dad y la defensa. Bogota: Ministerio de Defensa.
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (2007). The oecd dac handbook on security 
system reform (ssr). Paris: oecd.
Pastrana, A. (1998). Posesión de Gustavo Bell como alto 
consejero en derechos humanos-9 de septiembre de 
1998-. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=A4wTXCAu0gs
Presidencia de la República (2003). Política de defensa 
y seguridad democrática. Bogota: Presidencia de 
la República.
54
O P E R A ,  N o  2 0  •  E n e r o - J u n i o  2 0 1 7  •  p p .  3 5 - 5 4
J a v i e r  A l b e r t o  C a s t r i l l ó n  R i a s c o s ,  R e n é  A l o n s o  G u e r r a  M o l i n a
Presidencia de la Republica (2015). Colombia aportará 
tropas a las misiones de mantenimiento de paz de 
la onu. Retrieved from http://wp.presidencia.
gov.co/SitePages/Documentspdf/ny_peacekeep-
ing_final.pdf
Semana (2001). La prueba reina. Retrieved from http://
www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/la-prueba-
reina/45783-3
Semana (2002). Colombia ratifica Corte Internacional 
de Justicia. Retrieved from http://www.semana.
com/noticias/articulo/colombia-ratifica-corte-
internacional-justicia/51050-3
Serafino, N., Beittel, J., Ploch, L. & Rosen, L. (2014). 
“Leahy Law” human rights provisions and security 
assistance: Issue overview. Washington: Congres-
sional Research Service.
Simons, P. (2003). Hearing before the Senate Drug Cau-
cus. Retrieved from http://Bogota.usembassy.
gov/testimony2.html
The White House (2006). The national security strategy 
of the United States of America. Retrieved from 
https://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/nss2006.pdf
Tickner, A. B. (2014). Colombia, the United States, and 
security cooperation by proxy. Retrieved from 
https://www.wola.org/files/140318ti.pdf
United Nations (2012). The United Nations ssr perspec-
tive. New York: United Nations.
Uribe, A. (2010). Discurso completo del presidente Ál-
varo Uribe. Retrieved from http://www.semana.
com/politica/articulo/discurso-completo-del-
presidente-alvaro-uribe/119536-3
us Government Accountability Office (2008). Plan 
Colombia drug reduction goals were not fully 
met, but security has improved; us agencies need 
more detailed plans for reducing assistance. Re-
trieved from http://ccai-colombia.org/files/
primarydocs/0810usgao.pdf
us Southern Command (1999). Colombia human rights 
report 1999. Florida: National Security Archive.
usaid, dod & dos (2009). Security sector reform. Re-
trieved from http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/115810.pdf
